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  This study investigates the effect of auditor-management alignment on audit opinion over the 
period 2003- 2011 on 81 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange using logistic regression 
analysis. Results indicate that in companies with auditor-management alignment, auditor 
change level is low. In addition, the results indicate there is no relationship between   auditor-
management alignment, debt ratio, ownership percentage, firm size and auditor change with 
unqualified audit opinion. However, research evidences show that auditor's opinion type at 
previous year, audit fees, auditor type and return on assets ratio influence unqualified audit 
opinion. Among above variables, auditor's opinion types at previous year, audit fees and return 
on assets ratio have direct relationship with unqualified audit opinion but auditor type has a 
negative and inverse relationship with unqualified audit opinion.            
         © 2013 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction 
 
Auditing is one of the monitoring tools for carefully investigating managers' performance. Auditing plays 
an important role to control managers' opportunistic behavior and limit their motivation to manipulate 
earnings. Audit report is also one of the most effective reports on accounting information users' decisions. 
Furthermore, auditing reports are used for decision making about dividend payments and loan lending. 
However, there are always some conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders and lenders, audit 
aims to assure shareholders, lenders and other users about reliability of accounting information. In 
addition, other issues like lack of direct access to accounting information for users have caused to request 
independent audit services. In fact, audit plays role of information quality evaluation for users (Hassas 
Yeganeh & Dadashi, 2010). Agency theory recognizes the auditor as an independent agent from 
shareholders and other beneficiaries to control accuracy, reliability and relevancy of information prepared 
and presented by firms' managers. However, since auditing requires close relationship of auditor with 
firm's managers, thereby in this theory it is assumed that auditors may not preserve their independence and 
may not do their duties, properly. In other words, they perform along their own and manager's interests so   1218
that an alignment would be made among them and firms' managers (Walker, 2003). This study tries to 
investigate the impact of auditor-management alignment on audit opinion using agency theory. We assume 
that where auditor of parent and subsidiary companies are the same and there are common members in 
board of directors of the above firms, this may cause a kind of alignment between interests of managers 
and the auditors. In other words, the manager seeks for an auditor who presents unqualified audit report 
about his/her performance and thereby, auditors tend to continue his/her work and earn more audit fees. 
Lack of sufficient studies about alignment between interests of managers and auditors as well as 
competition in audit market of Iran create a motivation to conduct present study.  
This study contributes to the audit literatures as follows: First, result of the research can improve the 
theoretical fundamentals of previous studies about determinants of auditor's opinion in developing 
countries. Second, evidences will indicate that whether privatization of Iranian audit market and thereby 
increased authority to change the auditor will result in auditor-management alignment or not. This could 
provide useful information for the auditing market regulatory oversight board. Third, the results of this 
paper propose new ideas to conduct new studies in auditing field. The main question of this research is to 
find out how an auditor of parent and subsidiary companies can be effective on unqualified audit opinion 
in subsidiary company and this is the first objective of this survey. In addition, the second goal is to 
provide the determinants of audit opinion for users of accounting information, regulators of accounting 
and auditing standards, Iranian association of certified public accountants and stock exchange 
organization. In the following, theoretical fundamentals, variables and hypothesis testing are investigated.  
 
2.Theoretical framework and literature review 
 
Theoretical framework of this research roots in auditor-management alignment hypothesis. This 
hypothesis refers that manager chooses his/her desired auditor who meets his/her audit requirements. In 
this regard, auditor change phenomenon is lower in the firms with such an alignment. This hypothesis 
states that the relationships between auditor and manager result in reduction of auditor's independence and 
his/her professionalism. According to this relationship, auditor prefers his/her economic interests rather 
than independence, hence he/she will issue desired audit reports of managers particularly unqualified audit 
reports (Meyer et al., 2007; Malek & Ahmad, 2011). 
 
Nurul Houqe et al. (2012) studied the relationship between governmental economic power and auditor 
selection in 46 different countries. They indicated that the higher governmental quality in terms of political 
and economic aspects, the higher probability to select 4 great audit organizations. They also confirmed 
that in powerful economic countries that adopted international financial reporting standards, probability of 
the big 4 audit firms selection was higher. In addition, powerful government request more quality audit 
services . Malek and Ahmad (2011) investigated the effect of auditor-management alignment on 759 listed 
firms in Malaysia. They indicated that, the higher auditor-management alignment, the higher probability to 
issue unqualified audit report. Wang and Xin (2012) studied the relationship between auditor selection and 
earnings quality in listed firms in Hong Kong and reported that the firms that audit by the big 4 audit firms  
had higher earnings quality than other companies did. In addition, results confirmed that companies 
audited by small audit firms reported their profit understatement. 
 
Chen et al. (2010) reported that Chinese audit firms issued more unqualified audit reports compared with 
foreign ones for governmental firms. They also concluded that some companies choose local audit firms 
after receiving qualified audit report. Zhang et al. (2010) found that the firms with lower transparency 
chose small audit firms with low quality as auditor. They also indicated that the firms with political 
managers usually selected small audit firms as auditor. Lin and Liu (2009) investigated the impact of 
corporate governance system on auditor selection. They reported that firms with poor governance system 
select the small audit firms with lower quality than big 4 audit firms. In addition, they found that with 
improved corporate governance system, probability to select big 4 audit firms as auditor would be 
increased. Chena et al. (2009) reported that auditor change had direct relationship with issuing unqualified 
audit report. They also reported that managers changed their auditor to show their performance desired 
through and they could receive unqualified audit report and demonstrated a suitable performance for B. Banimahd et al. / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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company. Bewley et al. (2008), in a survey about deselecting Anderson audit firm as the auditor after 
declared bankrupt of Enron company, found some firms having Anderson as their auditor had changed this 
audit firm and had selected another before the lawsuit against the firm in court. However, most of firms 
had not changed their audit firms from Anderson to another. They concluded that the managers who 
changed their audit firm from Anderson to another had restated immediately their financial statements to 
improve their financial statements quality. Nevertheless, firms with delayed change of Anderson to 
another had lower quality financial statements. Berger and Hann (2007) declared that firms having high 
profitability were more interested in hiding their private information; therefore, they normally have more 
motivation to select lower quality auditors. Of course, managers of unprofitable firms may also intend to 
hide poor performance of the company from shareholders and investors through deceiving the auditors. 
Abidin (2006) indicated that developing countries normally choose big audit firms and explained that the 
firms with high debt ratio would not choose big audit firms as their auditors. He could not find any 
relationship between governance system and audit selection, but he showed there is a correlation between 
audit fees and auditor selection. 
 
3. The proposed study 
 
3.1. Variables 
 
In this study, dependent variable is a dummy audit opinion type shown by one and zero. In case of 
unqualified audit report, the value is set to one and zero, otherwise. Independent variables are as follows: 
 
Audit report type in the previous year : A dummy variable shown by 0 and 1. In case of unqualified audit 
report, the value is set to 1 and 0, otherwise. 
 
Auditor-Management Alignment : A dummy variable shown by 0 and 1. The value is set to 1 when both 
below conditions are met and 0, otherwise (Malek & Ahmad, 2011): 
 
A) A common member of board of directors should be in both parent and subsidiary companies. 
B) Auditor of both parent and subsidiary companies should be the same. 
 
Audit  fees :  This is a scale variable, which is calculated through natural logarithm of the audit expense of 
each company during each year. 
 
Auditor change : A dummy variable shown by 0/1. In case of auditor change during a year, the value is set 
1, otherwise it is 0. 
 
Company size : A scale variable showing size and magnitude of company. This is calculated based on 
natural logarithm of sale in each company during each year. 
 
Leverage : including total debt to total assets ratio. 
 
Auditor type: A dummy variable shown by 0/1. In case of private firm the value will be set 1; and zero, 
otherwise. 
 
Return on Assets: A ratio showing performance and profitability of a company. This variable is calculated 
by dividing net profit to total assets of a company. 
 
Ownership Percentage: A scale variable composed of shares percentage owned by parent company in 
subsidiary company shares. 
 
Industry type: A dummy variable shown by 0/1 for each industry. It is to explain that, industry type 
variable is considered as control variable in present study. 
 
3.2. Sample Selection and Research Method 
 
Our sample covers listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) across the period from 2003 to 2011. The 
sample selection criteria are:   1220
A. The end of fiscal year is March 21. 
B. Data is available at least for seven years over the period 2003-2011,  
C. The company is not loss frequently for three years. 
 
Given to above criteria, 81 companies were selected from different industries. It is to explain that some 
companies' data have been available since middle of research study. Therefore, observation number in all 
companies is not the same during the research period. Research method is correlation-type. Research data 
and information have extracted from financial statements of the listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange 
available in it's electronic database. Hypotheses' testing is conducted based on logistic regression. 
 
3.3. Research hypotheses 
 
Given theoretical fundamentals and literature review, following hypotheses are stated for this  study : 
Hypothesis 1 : There is a significant relationship between audit opinion  in the previous year and audit  
opinion  in the current year. 
Hypothesis 2 : There is a significant relationship between management-auditor alignment with  audit 
opinion . 
Hypothesis 3 : There is a significant relationship between audit fees with audit opinion. Hypothesis 4 : 
there is a significant relationship between auditor change with audit opinion . 
Hypothesis 5 : There is a significant relationship between company size with audit opinion. 
Hypothesis 6 : There is a significant relationship between debit ratio with audit opinion. 
Hypothesis 7 : There is a significant relationship between auditor type with audit opinion. 
Hypothesis 8 : There is a significant relationship between return on assets ratio with audit opinion  . 
Hypothesis 9 : There is a significant relationship between ownership percentage of parent  company 
with audit  opinion. 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics of research are presented in Tables 1 and Table 2. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics 
for research quantitative variables. 
 
Table 1 
 Descriptive statistics of research (quantitative variables) 
Variables  Observations  Debit Ratio  Return on Assets  Ownership 
Percentage 
Total Sale (Million 
Rials) 
Audit fees 
(Million Rials) 
Average  458  0.6950  0.0786  81.4  479437.3  262.95 
Median 458  0.7073  0.0735  90.6  163626  196.5 
Standard Deviation  458  0.3631  0.1895  20.81  1121840.2  239.98 
Min 458  0.000  -1.600  20.3  5  2 
Max  458  3.833  0.9629  100  12397704  1693 
 
In addition, Table 2 shows descriptive statistics associated with qualitative variables of the study. It 
indicates that the number of sample companies with same auditor is high. Also, unchanged of the auditor 
is much higher than auditor change. 
 
Table 2 
 Descriptive statistics of research (qualitative variables) 
Year  Audit Opinion   Management-Auditor 
Alignment 
Auditor change  Auditor type 
  Number of unqualified 
reports in the current year 
Number of qualified 
reports in the current year 
With 
alignment 
Without 
alignment 
Audit 
change 
Unchanged  
audit 
Private 
section 
Public 
section 
2003  0  4  2  2  0  13  3  1 
2004  8  13  15  6  2  14  12  9 
2005  11  17  19  9  2  20  16  12 
2006  13  19  18  14  8  22  21  11 
2007  13  31  25  19  6  54  28  16 
2008  23  36  30  29  8  52  34  25 
2009  33  45  44  34  12  70  52  26 
2010  45  48  58  35  16  71  65  28 
2011  45  54  56  43  16  72  68  31 
Total  191  267  267  191  70  388  299  159 
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3.5. Hypotheses Testing 
 
According to Table 3, it can be declared that variables with a significant level of fewer than five percent 
(i.e. opinion type in the previous year, audit fees, audit type and return on assets ratio) have a significant 
relationship with audit opinion in a significant level of 95 percent. Hence, hypotheses 1, 3, 7 and 8 are 
approved. But, since significant level of other variables is higher than 5 percent, there is a significant 
relationship between these variables and audit opinion. Hence, hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6 and 9 are rejected. 
 
Table 3  
Logistic regression estimates for the main model (N=458)  
(Dependent variable is unqualified Opinion (1) or qualified Opinion (0) in auditor report )  
p value    Variables   
 .023   - 4.091   Constant  
 .000    2.617   Audit report type in the previous year  
.308   -.277   Alignment  
 .039    .374   Audit Fees  
 .347    .346   Audit Change   
 .419    -.093   Client Size   
.548   .317   -    Debt Ratio  
.043   .592   -    Audit Type  
 .040   1.817   Return on Assets   
.267    .828   Ownership Percentage  
included       Industry fixed effects   
   0.383    Pseudo R Square   
0.000   220.174    Chi-Square  
 
3.6. Auditor's opinion model 
 
In this section, given the results yielded in hypotheses testing, mathematical model of auditor's opinion is 
used for investigated companies. In former section, it made clear that opinion type in the previous year, 
auditor's fees, auditor's type and return on assets ratio have effect and significant relationship with 
auditor's opinion type. In Table 3, the coefficients related to each of independent variables are identified. 
Therefore, auditor's opinion model is extracted from Table 3 as following : 
 
Y = - 4.091 + 2.617 X1 + 0.374 X2 – 0.592 X3 + 1.817 X4 
where: 
 
Y= Dependent variable is unqualified opinion (1) or qualified opinion (0) in auditor's report. 
X1= Audit report type in the previous year. In case of unqualified report, the value is 1 and 0, otherwise. 
X2= Auditor's fees which is composed of natural logarithm of audit fee for each company in each year 
X3= Audit type. In case of private audit , the value is set 1; otherwise, it is 0. 
X4= Return on total assets ratio which is an indicator of profitability and performance of company. 
 
Table 4 
 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Ownership 
Percentage   
Audit 
Fees   
Debt 
Ratio   
Return 
on Asset   
Size    Audit 
Type   
Alignment    Audit report type in 
the previous year   
Auditor 
Change   
  
.014   -.063   .071    -.093   -.034   .133   -.126   -.054    1   Auditor Change   
.112    .098    -.169    .107    .045    -.208    .144   1   
 
   Audit report type in the 
previous year   
.032    .063    -.086    .020    .035    -.021   1          Alignment   
.000    -.327    .008    -.087    -.257   1            Audit Type  
-.235    .476    -.196    .335   1              Size  
-.038   .174   -.448   1                   Return on Asset  
-.024   -.015   1                      Debt ratio  
-.226    1                        Audit Fees   
1                           Ownership Percentage  
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
 
Descriptive statistics results show that auditor change, audit fees and unqualified audit report have 
been increased during the research period. Hypotheses testing indicate that determinants in issuing 
unqualified audit report in study sample are: auditor's opinion in the previous year, audit fees, auditor 
type, return on assets have direct and positive relationships with issuing unqualified audit report in the   1222
current year. However, auditor type had negative and inverse relationship with auditor's unqualified 
opinion. Given the model, auditor's opinion in the previous year had the most severe relationship with 
issuing unqualified audit report in the current year. If auditor issued unqualified report in the previous 
year, the probability of issuing unqualified audit report would be 2.617 times. In other words, auditors 
prepare audit report of each year in accordance with audit report of the previous year. In addition, if 
return on assets ratio (i.e. indicator of profitability and performance of company) is high, the 
probability of issuing unqualified audit report will be 1.817 times. This suggests that the companies 
without profitability problem, meet the accounting standards more and thereby their audit report will 
be unqualified. Evidences of the study have indicated that if the auditor is a private audit firm, the 
probability of issuing unqualified audit report will be reduced up to 0.592 times. Results also show 
that with higher auditing fees, the probability of issuing unqualified audit report will be 0.374. Results 
also indicate that there is no relationship between management-auditor alignment, debit ratio, 
ownership percentage, company size with issuing unqualified audit opinion. 
 
Results show that audit fees have direct relationship with unqualified audit report. Therefore, Iranian 
association of certified  public accountants and Tehran stock exchange organization are proposed to 
have more control on way of determining audit fees and audit quality of audit firms. Results indicate 
that auditors prepare audit report of each year in accordance with audit report of the previous year. 
This causes that audit firms may spend lower time and budget for audit. Hence, Iranian association of 
certified  public accountants and Tehran stock exchange organization are proposed to pay attention on 
spent time and budget in evaluation of the audit  firms quality. Evidences approve that issuing 
unqualified audit report is more than those in private audit firms are. Therefore, it is proposed to 
compare and survey audit quality in audit organization with private audit firms. 
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